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I. INTRODUCTION
A.

In General

Curiously, the widely adopted Uniform Partnership Act (U.P.A.)
of 1914 is silent on a group of issues that are fundamental to partnership law. These issues are the subject of the present Article. They
include the capacity of partnerships to sue and be sued as partnerships
or entities, and the related matters of whether fewer than all the partners can sue on a partnership right, or be sued on a partnership
obligation.
The U.P.A. inspired a grand debate between proponents of the entity and aggregate theories of partnership. On the entity side was Professor Judson A. Crane, a major writer on partnership law.' On the
aggregate side was Dean William Draper Lewis, the principal drafter
of the U.P.A.2 The debate focused on the nature of a "legal person"
and practical problems of property ownership and creditors' rights.
Other than the abstract discussion of "legal person," no serious consideration was given to the capacity of partnerships to sue or be sued or
to the procedural problems in the debate.3 The Official Comments to
1. E.g., Crane, The Uniform PartnershipAct-A Critique, 28 HARv. L. REV. 762
(1915) [hereinafter Crane, Critique]; J. CRANE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1952).
2. Lewis, The Uniform PartnershipAct-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29
HARV.L. REV.158 (1916).
3. Crane mentions among many examples of entity treatment statutes in five states
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the U.P.A. fail to mention the issues. 4
One may speculate on the reasons for the omission of capacity and
procedural aspects from the U.P.A. The drafters may have been too
preoccupied with property ownership and creditors' rights or with internal partnership questions to be interested in these aspects. Partnerships in the early part of the century may have had so few partners
that it seemed easier to expect all partners to be parties to litigation, as
the common law generally required. The common law and its exceptions may have seemed adequately clear and efficient. The drafters of
the substantive law may have felt they should not deal with procedural questions. They may have believed that the courts should be left
to puzzle out the consequences of their expressed preference for the
aggregate theory combined with their functional adoption of many entity features in the statute.
B.

Enforcement of Partnership Rights
Whatever the drafters' reasons, they did not specify whether part-

nerships can sue or who can sue for the partnerships. This left the
enforcement of a partnership claim or rights in a confusion caused by
the combination (and conflict) of entity and aggregate theories of partnership and by the variations in state procedural requirements, some
of which reflect one or the other theory.
There are four principal methods, defined by the styles of the lawsuits, that might be used to enforce partnership claims:
(1) An action by all the partners in their own names: A, B & C v.
D, or A, B, & C trading as ABC & Co. v. D.6 This direct suit,
allowing partnerships to sue in the firm name and eight allowing partnerships to
be sued in the firm name. Crane, Critique,supra note 1, at 768-69. Lewis, as an
objection to the entity theory, assumes that all partnerships would have to register their names publicly in order for partnerships to be sued in the firm name.
Lewis, supra note 2, at 167. Later comment on the debate has noted but not
plumbed the reasons for the U.P.A.'s failure to deal with suits. See, eg., Jensen,
Is a PartnerhipUnder the Uniform PartnershipAct an Aggregate or an Entity?,
16 VAND. L. REV. 377, 379, 382-83 (1963).
4. UNiF. PARTNERsim
AcT § 6, 6 U.L-. 1, 22-24 (1969).
5. Courts clinging to an extreme version of the aggregate theory of partnership may
say or imply that there are no partnership claims, only partners' claims. E.g.,
McClain v. Buechner, 776 S.W.2d 481,483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). But it is clear that
partnerships have claims under the U.P.A. E.g., UNi. PARTNERSHIP Acr
§ 9(3)(e), 6 U.L.A. 1, 132 (1969)(unanimous partner consent necessary to "submit
a partnership claim... to arbitration"). See also id. §§ 8, 17, 24, 25, 38(b), 40(a),
(h), 41(1), 42, 6 U.L.A. at 115, 207 324, 326, 456, 468-69, 590, 521 (all referring to
partnership property).
In speaking of enforcement, this Article uses "right" and "claim" interchangeably though of course a claim becomes a right only when upheld.
6. This latter form is required by PA. P CwV. P. 2127 which may be the only rule or
statute that deals specifically with the styling of partnership suits.
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inherited from the common law, is permitted in almost all
states and required in a few. It is discussed in Part II.
(2) An action by fewer than all the partners in their own names: A
v. D, or A & B v. D. This direct suit, as affected by the U.P.A.,
is considered in Part III below and, as affected by other criteria,
in Part IV below. It is for the benefit of the partnership but
somewhat distinct from a derivative suit, discussed in paragraph (3) and Part V below.
(3) An action by fewer than all the partners in their own names
but in behalf of the partnership: A in behalf of ABC Partnership v. D, or A derivatively for ABC Partnershipv. D, or A in
the right of ABC Partnershipv. D. This derivative suit, still in
a developing stage, is considered in Part V.
(4) An action by the partnership as plaintiff, in its own name: ABC
Partnershipv. D. This direct suit, authorized by statute or procedural rule in a number of states and by caselaw in a few, is
considered in Part VI below.
The methods, especially the second and third, are not always distinguished in practice and are not easily distinguished in theory. Cutting across the last three methods is the question of who can bring the
action and in what circumstances.
It is convenient to discuss these questions in the context of enforcement of partnership claims by lawsuit, since the questions are most
likely to arise there and most of the case authority is there. But nonjudicial forms of enforcement, to the extent not covered by the partnership agreement or a partner's agency authority under the U.P.A.7
should be governed by the same principles. Nonjudicial forms include
foreclosures, repossessions, setoffs or other means of self help. However, the U.P.A.8 requires unanimous consent of the partners to submit a partnership claim to arbitration. 9
Questions of the kind discussed here are raised by third-party defendants-unjustifiably in many if not most situations-by motion to
dismiss or for summary judgment for failure to state a claim, for lack
of standing, capacity, authority, joinder, jurisdiction or real party in
interest. They are also raised by the partners who did not initiate the
action (e.g., following their motion to intervene). In some of the more
heated contests, those partners are defendants or among the defend7. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 9(1), 6 U.L.A. 1, 132 (1969). Section 9(1) is discussed at
length in A. BROMBERG & L. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP §§ 4.01-.04 (1988).
8. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 9(3)(a), 6 U.L.A. 1, 132 (1969).
9. Id. § 9(3)(e), 6 U.L.A. at 132. REv. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AT § 301 (Discussion
Draft 1991) would eliminate the requirement of unanimous consent for arbitration and thus facilitate alternative dispute resolution in accordance with current

preferences. See id. § 301 comment.
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ants. In situations of this sort, the courts may reach different results,
as noted in Parts IV and V below.
Sharply different policies apply to enforcement objections by noninitiating partners and by third-party defendants. Noninitiating partners are properly concerned with efficient use of partnership resources in the enforcement effort-will it be unduly costly relative to
the probable return or unduly distractive from partnership operations--and with other possible consequences-will business relations
or reputations be harmed. Third-party defendants are naturally concerned with avoiding liability. But their only properly cognizable concern is avoiding multiple suits on the same claims. This concern is
satisfied if the first suit has preclusive effect. Part II below examines
this question and concludes that preclusive effect is normally the result.1o Consequently, there will be little or no justification for recognizing a third-party defendant's objection that fewer than all the
partners are trying to enforce the partnership claim. Nonetheless, for
completeness, I will consider the objections third parties have made.
The federal courts determine capacity to sue or be sued in partnership cases by the law of the state in which the court sits except that in
federal question (as opposed to diversity) cases, partnerships may sue
and be sued in their common names.This Article considers only enforcement of claims of general partnerships. Enforcement of claims of limited partnerships raises similar
issues with respect to the general partners but is not considered here.
A critique of the whole untidy area of enforcement of partnership
rights appears in Part VII below.
II. ENFORCEMENT OF PARTNERSHIP RIGHTS BY ALL
PARTNERS
A.

In General

This Part deals with the enforcement of partnership rights by all
the partners together, which was the common law practice. It is sufficient almost everywhere and necessary in a relatively small number of
states. Its rationale is considered below along with the preclusive ef12
fect of enforcement by fewer than all the partners.
10. See infra section II.D.
11. FED. R. Crv. P. 17(b). See, e.g., Caliber Partners, Ltd. v. Affeld, 583 F. Supp. 1308,
1313-14 (N.D. M. 1984)(limited partnerships have capacity to sue on federal securities claims but not on pendent state law claims for which Illinois law controls);
Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 110 Mont. 251, 714 P.2d 155
(1986)(construing local law on a certified question from the Ninth Circuit).
12. See infra section II.D.
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Sufficiency of All Partners

All partners together can enforce a partnership right in virtually
every jurisdiction in the United States.1 3 This follows from any or all
of several sources: (1) their management rights which can be exercised unanimously even in extraordinary matters;1 4 (2) their authority as agents of the partnership;' 5 (3) their co-ownership of
16
partnership property (which includes a claim against a third party);
7
and (4) their broad ability to deal with it by unanimous agreement.'
The result is generally the same whether entity or aggregate theory
prevails.18
C.

Necessity of All Partners

As at common law, in some states such as Florida, Illinois and Missouri, all partners must act together (ie., all must sue to enforce a
partnership right).19 These states typically adhere to the aggregate
theory of partnership under which the claims belong to the partners
jointly rather than to the partnership. The partners are all considered
indispensable or necessary parties. 20 Without a statute or rule to the
contrary, all must sue on the claim.21 Joinder of all partners is often
stated to be the requirement for contract claims22 but it is extended to
13. See, eg., Baron v. Lerman, 719 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. App. 1986)(the court notes but does
not rule on the defendants' claim that the plaintiffs failed to prove that all partners were plaintiffs; the implication is that plaintiffs need not prove this but that
defendants may disprove it); Deal Farms, Inc. v. Farm & Ranch Supply, Inc., 382
So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)(both joint venturers may sue defendant
although defendant dealt with only one of them and did not know of joint
venture).
14. UNU'. PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 9(1), 18(e), (h), 6 U.L.A. 1, 132, 213 (1969).
15. Id. §§ 6(1), 25, 6 U.L.A. at 22, 326.
16. Id. § 9(1), 6 U.L.A. at 132.
17. Id. §§ 6(1), 25, 6 U.L.A. at 25, 326.
18. However, a strong adherence to entity theory, as in Louisiana, may lead to the
conclusion that only the partnership can enforce its right.
19. See infra notes 20 & 21.
20. Where the partners have changed, it is the partners at the time of the transactions underlying the claim that must be joined according to Smith v. Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 505 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
21. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 298(1)(1979)(unless all joint obligees
are joined as plaintiffs or defendants, promisor can by appropriate objection prevent recovery of judgment). But ef id. § 298(2)(unless limited by agreement, any
joint obligee can sue in the name of all joint obligees for enforcement by money
judgment). Semble, Henson v. First Sec. & Loan Co., 2 P.2d 85 (Wash. 1931). It is
not always clear from the reported decisions whether it is sufficient that all partners are named as plaintiffs even though they are not active in the suit.
22. See Harrell & Sumner Contracting Co. v. Peabody Petersen Co., 546 F.2d 1227,
1229 (5th Cir. 1977)(joint venturer is indispensable party a matter of federal law,
at least for diversity purposes); Purcel v. Wells, 236 F.2d 469, 472 (10th Cir.
1956)(applying Oklahoma and Texas law); Robb Container Corp. v. Sho-Me Co.,
566 F. Supp. 1143, 1156 (N.D. Ill. 1983)(applying Illinois law; contract, unfair com-
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other claims as well. 23
D.

Rationales; Preclusive Effect of Enforcement by Fewer Than All
Partners

The main rationale given by the courts (and defendants) for requiring all partners to sue is that this will protect the defendant from multiple suits. 2 4 The rationale is weak since the plaintiff partner's suit on
a partnership claim should preclude other suits on the same claim:2 5
"The partnership will be bound by the act of the single partner in
bringing suit and any recovery will discharge the partnership's claim
petition and antitrust claims); Aronovitz v. Stein Properties, 322 So. 2d 74, 76 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975)(each partner has an interest in the contract); Johnson v.
Kentucky Youth Research Center, Inc., 682 S.W.2d 799 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985);
American Central Ry. Co. v. Miles, 52 l.174,178 (1869)(citing pre-U.P.A. authority); Karp v. Coolview of Wis., Inc., 25 Wis. 2d 299, 302, 130 N.W.2d 790, 794
(1964)(partners are indispensable; nonjoinder may be raised whenever court has
jurisdiction).
23. See, e.g., Zion v. Sentry Safety Control Corp., 258 F.2d 31, 34 (3d Cir. 1958)(applying Pennsylvania law; claim for compensation for services by lawyers); Excalibur
Oil, Inc. v Sullivan, 659 F. Supp. 1539, 1540 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1987)(applying Illinois
law, dictum; nature of claim not stated); Robb Container Corp. v. Sho-Me Co., 566
F. Supp. 1143,1156 (N.D. Ill.
1983)(Illinois law); McClain v. Buechner, 776 S.W.2d
481, 486 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)(legal malpractice claim); N.E.&R. Partnership v.
Stone, 745 S.W.2d 266,267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)(nature of claim not stated; general
partnership X as general partner of limited partnership Y could sue for limited
partnership Y only by naming all general partners of X as plaintiffs); Allgeier,
Martin & Assocs. v. Ashmore, 508 S.W.2d 524,525 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974)(claim for
reasonable value of work and services; "generally, all partners are necessary parties-plaintiff to enforce an obligation due the partnership").
24. E.g., Smith v. Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 505 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (W.D.
Mo. 1981); DeToro v. Dervan Inv. Ltd. Corp., 483 So. 2d 717, 721 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986); Spiritas v. Robinowitz, 544 S.W.2d 710, 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
Other rationales are even less convincing. One rationale asserted is that a
partner can release a claim and moot another partner's suit. See McClain v.
Buechmer, 776 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). It is true that a partner can
release a partnership claim pursuant to actual or apparent authority under UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9(1), 6 U.L.A. 1, 132 (1969), and that a joint obligee generally
can release the joint obligation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 299

(1979). But this is more a reason to permit a partner to enforce a claim, which
may benefit the partnership, than to deny the partner a right to enforce the
claim, which may hurt the partnership.
A second rationale for the requirement of all partners is that an obligation to a
partnership makes the partners co-obligees; allowing one partner to enforce it
changes the obligation from joint to several. See McClain v. Buechner, 776 S.W.2d
481, 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). Assuming such a change is important, it is hard to
see how a suit to enforce in behalf of the partnership or in behalf of all the partners makes that change.
25. Preclusive effect assumes that the suit goes to final judgment. See generally F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, CnriL PROCEDURE § 11.4 (1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980). Settlement or compromise will normally be preclusive
too.
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against the defendants." 26
Preclusive effect is justified in most cases by the plaintiff partner's
actual or apparent authority to litigate a partnership claim. This result is reinforced by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, coupled with the privity-recognized in a number of
jurisdictions-between the partners and the partnership and among
the partners. A recovery by one partner will preclude a later suit by a
copartner or the partnership.2 7 The same doctrines operate if the
partner loses: the copartners and partnership are barred from suing
again.28 Due process considerations ought to be satisfied by the plaintiff partner's representative capacity, 29 by the knowledge of the suit
26. Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 165 F. Supp. 933, 937 (S.D. Cal. 1958)(partnership had dissolved and was winding up). Leh was noted in Recent Cases-Federal
Courts--Authorityof State Law--One of Two General PartnersAllowed to Bring
Suit Under Clayton Act in Contravention of State Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 411
(1959). See also F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIvIL PROCEDURE § 11.29, at 646 (1985).
The partner will hold in trust for the partnership any recovery. UNIF. PARTNERsHm Acr § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. 1, 258 (1969).
27. Schoenborn v. Williams, 272 P. 992, 994 (Mont. 1928)(stated as rationale for allowing partner to sue for entire partnership claim rather than only his half; claim
for impounded proceeds of sale of partnership cattle); Murry v. Eighth Ave. RIR.
Co., 120 Misc. 784, 199 N.Y.S. 716 (N.Y. App. Term. 1923)(partner's prior recovery
is res judicata of suit by partner and copartner which is in effect suit by partnership; tort claim for injury to partnership horse and truck); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 60(2)(b)(1980).
28. Smith v. Jenkins, 562 A.2d 610, 616 (D.C. App. 1989)(judgment against general
partner in prior suit bars suit by limited partners on same claim); Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552, 555-57, 768 P.2d 815, 818-20 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989)(judgment
against liquidating partner (apparently suing for partnership) in prior proceeding
bars suit by partner and copartner doing business as partnership on same claim);
Feinberg v. Stasilitis, 118 A. 694 (N.J. 1922)(judgment against partner in prior suit
bars suit by partnership on substantially the same claim); Grimm v. Rizk, 640
S.W.2d 711, 716 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982)(judgment against partner, who was also
trustee for partners or partnership, in prior suit bars suit by copartners), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1045 (1984); RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 60(2)(a)
(1980).
See Hammonds v. Holmes, 559 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. 1977)(dismissal of prior
suit with prejudice at request of plaintiffs barred later suit by same plaintiffs
doing business as partnership); Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 165 F. Supp. 933,
937 (S.D. Cal. 1958)(judgment for costs against partner will bind partnership assets and at least the assets of the plaintiff partner). But see Pate v. George P.
Wyly & Co., 118 Ga. 262,264,45 So. 217,218 (1903)(judgment against partner individually not conclusive as to partnership which was not a party to the suit);
Figarra v. Saitta, 91 N.Y.S. 728 (N.Y. App. Term. 1905)(judgment for defendant in
suit by partner individually does not bar suit against defendant by partnership's
assignee on same claim). Somewhat different considerations may prevail in the
application of res judicata, collateral estoppel and privity to partners and partnerships as defendants. See Annotation, Judgment for or Against Partneras Res
Judicata in Favor of or Against Copartner not a Party to the Judgment, 11
A.L.R.2d 847 (1950).
29. See, eg., Hammonds v. Holmes, 559 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. 1977); Grimm v. Rizk,
640 S.W.2d 711, 716 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1045 (1984).
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attributed from the plaintiff partner to the partnership 3 0 and (by implication) to the copartners,3 1 and by their opportunity to intervene.32
Nonetheless, courts have occasionally permitted second suits by
33
copartners.
A variant and somewhat more cogent (and traditional) rationale
offered by the courts (and defendants) is that requiring all partners to
sue will conserve judicial resources.3 4 Later suits by different partners, even if subject to dismissal or other summary disposition, would
consume some court time.
From the viewpoint of the nonjoining partners and the partnership, there are several reasons for requiring all the partners-or at
least more than one-to sue. The suit may be a poor use of partnership resources; for example, if the claim is weak, the time and money
costs of enforcement may be high, or the chances of collecting a judgment or settlement may be small. Enforcement of the claim may
harm the partnership's business relations with the defendant or with
others. The plaintiff partner's choice of counsel or method of handling the suit may not satisfy the other partners. Moreover, the suit
may lead to counterclaims against the partnership for which all partners are personally liable.35 However, these are similar to other risks
of shared management which partners normally assume in a
partnership.
Court opinions requiring all partners to sue typically do not consider the relevance of the U.P.A.36 because they assume that it has no
relevance.37 As Part III shows, the U.P.A. is relevant and should be
used as a guide.
Unanimous enforcement by partners is often impractical; for example, the partners may be numerous, or scattered, or in disagreement about enforcement of the right. Thus it is important to analyze
30. UNiF. PARTNERsam AcT § 12, 6 U.L.A. 1, 160 (1969).
31. Grimm v. Rizk, 640 S.W.2d 711, 716 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982)(section 12 of the U.P.A.
"contemplates that a partnership as a whole is charged with knowledge of or notice to a partner"), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1045 (1984). It is imbortant that the
other partners be aware of the enforcement effort for at least two reasons. This
may be necessary for due process in order for res judicata or collateral estoppel to
operate and prevent later suits by other partners. It is also appropriate, if not
necessary, to allow partnership governance or management provisions to operate.

32. For example, this would be the case under rules similar to FED. R. CIrv. P. 24.
33. See Figarra v. Saitta, 91 N.Y.S. 728 (N.Y. App. Term. 1905); Pate v. George P.
Wyly & Co., 118 Ga. 262, 45 So. 217 (1903). For a synopsis of these cases, see note
28 above.
34. Pine Prods. Corp. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 11, 14 (1988).
35. See Cates v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161,1179 (5th Cir. 1985)(applying Texas law), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
36. See Aronovitz v. Stein Properties, 322 So. 2d 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
37. See Allgeier, Martin & Assocs. v. Ashmore, 508 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
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the exceptions to the unanimity requirement. These are discussed in
Parts III to IV.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF PARTNERSHIP RIGHTS BY FEWER
THAN ALL PARTNERS-UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
ACT CRITERIA
In General

A.

Part II above narrates the need for all partners to enforce partnership rights or claims in some states. This Part discusses the U.P.A.'s
provisions that offer guidance on enforcement of partnership claims
by fewer than all the partners. Other bases on which fewer than all
the partners may be permitted to enforce partnership claims are analyzed in Part V.
The U.P.A. does not deal explicitly with the enforcement of a partnership's claims. Perhaps for this reason the courts rarely apply the
U.P.A.'s provisions to decide whether fewer than all the partners may
sue on a partnership claim. Nonetheless, several sections are relevant,38 provide reasonable guides and should be considered. These
provisions are discussed in the remaining sections of Part III. However, these provisions may lead to different results-ranging from individual action through majority action to unanimous actiondepending on which is deemed controlling and whether a partner or a
nonpartner is raising the issue, and perhaps depending on the nature
of the partnership. Thus, the immediately following sections of Part
III assume that there is no partnership agreement in point;39 the final
section of Part III considers the effect of an agreement.40 Part VII of
the Article reconciles the provisions and shows their best combined
effect.
A defendant may use a variety of ways to challenge a partnership
suit brought by fewer than all the partners. Depending on the applicable procedural rules, the methods may include motions to dismiss or
for summary judgment based on lack of standing, capacity, authority,
joinder, jurisdiction or real party in interest.
If fewer than all the partners succeed in enforcing a partnership
right, they hold in trust for the partnership any recovery, or must41account to the partnership for it, unless the other partners consent.
B.

Equal Management Rights
The enforcement of a partnership's rights in contract, tort, owner-

38. Cates v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161, 1176-77 (5th Cir. 1985)(applying Texas law), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
39. See inkfra text accompanying notes 42-71.
40. See infra section III.F.
41. UNiF. PARTNERSHip AcT § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. 1, 258 (1969).
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ship or otherwise is an aspect of the management and conduct of the
partnership business. Consequently all partners "have equal rights"
in enforcement under the U.P.A.42 Section 18(e) can be reasonably
read to mean that any partner can enforce a partnership obligation:
Each partner has the power to use ordinary legal process to enforce obligations owed the partnership and therefore may engage counsel to sue on behalf
of the firm ....
If the law were otherwise, valuable rights might be lost by
failure to4 3sue (for example) within a statutory period or to plead certain
defenses.

On the other hand, section 18(e) can be read to mean that a partner
can enforce a partnership obligation only if no other partner objects.
Or, section 18(e) can be regarded as limited only by section 18(h),44
discussed in the following section. 45 Of the three readings, the second
is inappropriate since the statutory tone is more a grant of power or
authority than one of limitation. 46 Limitation is the tone of section
18(h), discussed in the next section. The choice between the first and
third readings is effectively made in Part VII below after consideration of the other pertinent sections.
C. Majority Rule for Ordinary Matters on Which There Is Disagreement
The enforcement of the partnership right is a "matter connected
with the partnership business" in the language of the U.P.A.47 If it is
considered "an ordinarymatter connected with the partnership business" on which there is disagreement among the partners, it "may be
decided4 by a majority of the partners." "May" apparently means
"must" 8 whenever the partners make a decision. If read literally as
"may" in any other situation, it would tell us little or nothing since the
42. Id. § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. at 213. The complications of this section are discussed in A.
BROMBERG & L. RmSTEm,

43.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

BROmBERG AND RmSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 6.03

(1988).
Thompson Door Co. v. Haven Fund, 351 A.2d 864,865 (Del. 1976) (contract breach
claim). This ruling appears to be general and is probably intended to be. But it
may be qualified by the fact that the defendants were corporations with which
the copartners were affiliated as officers. The clause omitted from the quote in
the text is "that rule is particularly significant, and necessary, when a majority of
the general partners has a divided interest." Id. This aspect is considered further
in section IV.B below. The suit was brought in the partnership name under a
statute explicitly permitting that.
Lane v. Krein, 297 S.C. 13, 375 S.E.2d 351 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988). See infr note 49
(summarizing the case).
See infra section III.C.
In addition, a veto power in a single partner is in essence a unanimity rule which
would impose substantial costs because of the inevitability of disagreement.
UNIF. PARTNERsHIp Acr § 18(h), 6 U.L.A. 1, 213-14 (1969).
See Summers v. Dooley, 94 Idaho 87, 481 P.2d 318, 320 (1971)(section 18(h) of the
U.P.A. is mandatory, not permissive). The "may" clearly means that the decision
need not be unanimous.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1

preamble to section 18 of the U.P.A. states that everything in the section is subject to agreement among the partners.
Under this majority rule principle a partner cannot maintain a suit
to enforce a partnership claim if a majority of the partners disagree
with the enforcement. 49 The disagreement should be manifested
early in the suit (otherwise waived). This presupposes that partners
are informed of the suit. There are indications of the stricter view
that a partner cannot maintain a suit to enforce a partnership right
unless a majority of the partners affirmatively agree to the enforcement.5 0 This stricter view is inconsistent with section 18(h) which im49. See Hauer v. Bankers Trust of N.Y. Corp., 65 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Wis. 1974)(Wisconsin
law; federal antitrust, state contract and fiduciary breach and other claims). In
Hauerthe partnership agreement stated that "[a] majority of the managing partners shall be authorized... to determine all questions relating to the conduct and
management of the partnership business, and the determination of a majority of
the managing partners on any such question... shall be binding." Id. at 4. Two
of the three managing partners objected to the suit filed by the third on behalf of
the partnership. The suit was dismissed for lack of plaintiff's capacity to assert
claims for the partnership.
See also Lane v. Krein, 375 S.E.2d 351 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988)(conversion claim).
In Lane the partnership agreement gave each partner an equal voice in management. One partner sued, naming third parties and the other three partners as
defendants and conspirators in the conversion. The three partners denied that
the partnership had authorized suit. Treating the partnership as an entity governed by majority rule in event of disagreement, the court affirmed dismissal of
the conversion claim for lack of plaintiff's capacity to sue. The court noted that
plaintiff had a remedy in accounting against the three partners.
See Coast v. Hunt Oil Co., 195 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1952)(applying Louisiana law;
49% partner cannot enforce partnership antitrust claim when 51% partner refuses to join; only partnership can enforce under Louisiana entity theory).
50. One court has said.
Indeed, the general rule seems to be that even a single partner, at least
absent the consent of a majority of the partners, may not ordinarily [sue
on a partnership] cause of action as a whole, whether in the name of the
partnership or in his own name, or for the fractional share of such a
cause of action corresponding to his fractional interest in the
partnership.
Cates v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161, 1176 (5th Cir. 1985), cert
denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988). The court did not so hold. Rather, it indicated that
the executrix of a dead partner-a fortiori a partner-might enforce a partnership claim or his or her fraction of it in exceptional circumstances, discussed in
sections IV.B and V.C below. The partnerships formed and administered group
insurance trusts for employers. The suit was against the insurer and reinsurer
for damage to the partnerships through contract breach (e.g., by failing to pay
claims properly, failing to market programs in good faith, unreasonably raising
rates and forcing the partnerships improperly to pay taxes) and for antitrust violations restricting competition by the partnerships and attempting to destroy
them.
See also Noguera v. Maisel & Assocs. of Mich., 147 Mich. App. 119, 124, 369
N.W.2d 492, 498-99 (1985). A partner could not maintain a usury claim against the
managing partner for its loans to the partnership since the partner was not a
borrower (even though he was jointly liable for the loan). "[A]ny attempt to
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poses majority rule for an ordinary matter only if there is partner
disagreement. There appears to be no need for all members of the
required majority to be parties plaintiff; it is sufficient if their consent
is demonstrated.51
Section 18(h) of the U.P.A. implies that if enforcement of the right
is an ordinary matter and there is no disagreement among the partners, any partner can enforce the right. If the other partners are indifferent, the suing partner may proceed. This is consistent with the
first reading of section 18(e) given in the preceding section (ie., any
partner can enforce a partnership obligation).
Section 18(h) implies that if enforcement of the right is not an "ordinary matter," and there is disagreement among the partners, something more than majority decision is required.52 Unanimity is the
logical alternative, although other answers may be possible based on
the partners' expectations. Unanimity is the alternative chosen by the
courts.s3
It is hard to generalize about when a matter will be more than "ordinary." An "ordinary matter" can reasonably be equated to a matter
"for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership"-the language used in section 9(1) of the U.P.A. to describe
the scope of a partner's authority to bind the partnership. This aspect
is discussed below.54 Since litigation is almost commonplace in the
United States, enforcement of a partnership's claim will often be an
ordinary matter and subject to section 18(h) of the U.P.A.
A possible example of an extraordinary matter in the present context is an enforcement that is likely to be very costly in relation to the
value obtained if it is successful. A claim against one or more of the
partners probably should not be considered an ordinary matter.M It

51.
52.

53.
54.
55.

avoid repayment based on usury claims would also be a matter of majority control." Id The remaining partners disagreed with other parts of the suit and may
have disagreed with this part. So it is not clear whether the court is requiring
that a majority approve the claim or only that they not object to it.
See Miller v. Stout, 706 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)(error to exclude evidence of consent of another partner whose interest plus the plaintiffs' would have
exceeded the two-thirds required by the partnership agreement).
Proposed section 401(j) of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act makes explicit
the implication in section 18(h) of the U.P.A. The Revised Act provides: "No act
outside the ordinary course of partnership business... may be undertaken rightfully without the consent of all the partners." REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHm AMT
§ 401(j)(Discussion Draft 1991). But, to preserve the ability of persons dealing
with the partnership to rely on apparent authority, section 401(j) of the Revised
Act adds: '"Iis section does not limit the obligations of the partnership to third
parties under Section 301."
See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
See infra section III.E.
Lane v. Krein, 375 S.E.2d 351 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988), treated a suit against third
parties and three partners as an ordinary matter to be decided by majority rule.
But the court had no occasion to consider a unanimity requirement since the

14
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should be treated as described below.5 6
There are equitable reasons to apply the majority or unanimity requirements only to the disinterested partners when some partners
have a conflict of interest as to the enforcement-as opposed to a disagreement about the wisdom of enforcement.
D.

Use of Partnership Property

57
A partnership claim or cause of action is partnership property
and does not belong to any partner individually. A partner cannot sue
in his or her own name to enforce a partnership claim individually
(i.e., to keep the recovery personally). 58 For the same reason, it is usually held that a partner cannot individually enforce a fraction of a
partnership claim any more than he or she can individually enforce
the entire claim. Thus a one-third partner cannot sue for one-third of
a partnership claim.59

56.
57.
58.

59.

three partners were a majority and sufficient to stop the suit under majority rule.
See supra note 49 (summarizing the case).
See infra section IV.B.
See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 8, 6 U.L.A. 1, 115 (1969).
Heinz v. Simon & Flynn, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)(applying New
York law to a conversion claim of joint venture); Stephen v. Phillips, 101 N.M.
790, 793, 689 P.2d 939, 941-43 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984)(partner not entitled to individual damages for conversion of partnership property); Kirschbaum v. Merchants
Bank of N.Y., 272 A.D. 336,336,71 N.Y.S.2d 79,80 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947)(debt due
partnership; partner must sue for partnership); Godwin v. Vinson, 251 N.C. 326,
111 S.E.2d 180 (1959)(collection of loan).
See Cates v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161,1176 (5th Cir. 1985)(applying Texas law), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988); Coast v. Hunt Oil Co., 195
F.2d 870 (5th Cir.)(applying Louisiana law; 49% partner cannot sue for 49% of
antitrust claim), cert denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952); Pine Prods. Corp. v. United
States, 15 Ct. Cl. 11, 14 (1988)(claim for refund of overpayment to government by
joint venture); Stevens v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 722, 381 N.Y.S.2d 927
(1976)(contract breach claim); Ruzicka v. Rager, 305 N.Y. 191, 197, 111 N.E.2d 878,
881 (N.Y. 1953)("[A] member of a partnership may not recover upon a partnership obligation individually."); Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984). See
also Credit Francais Int'l v. Sociedad Financiera de Comercio, 128 Misc. 2d 564,
575-78, 490 N.Y.S.2d 670, 681-84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985)(bank which deposited
$3,000,000 in bank pool of $25,000,000 with common agent for loan to defendant
could not sue for nonpayment of its $3,000,000 part; bank pool considered to be a
joint venture).
But see Cates v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1180, 1183 (5th Cir.
1985)(indicating that a fractional claim might be allowed where controlling partners conspired with defendant to injure the partnership and prevent a suit), cert
denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988); Leff v. Gunter, 33 Cal. 3d 3, 189 Cal. Rptr. 377, 658
P.2d 740 (1983). In Leffa one-sixth partner (joint venturer) was allowed to sue a
copartner and win his one-sixth of the lost profit from the copartner's fiduciary
breach, although the third partner chose not to sue. The copartner bid for and
obtained a construction contract on which other partners were bidding for the
partnership. The Leff court did not discuss the right to sue on what appears to be
a partnership claim.
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On the other hand, each partner is co-owner of partnership property as tenant-in-partnership within the strictures of the U.P.A.60 The
right to "possess" partnership property for partnership purposes can
reasonably be construed to permit any partner to enforce a partnership right in the interest of the partnership. 6 ' This can take the form
of a derivative suit, discussed in Part V below, or any other suit in
which the partner represents the partnership and holds for the partnership any recovery. 62 A partner's interest in a partnerslip right or
claim is sufficient to satisfy procedural rules63 that require suits to be
brought by real parties in interest.
E. Partner Authority
If the enforcement is considered to be carrying on the business of
the partnership in the usual way (ie., equivalent to an ordinary matter under section 18(h) of the U.P.A.), any partner can bind the partnership to third-party defendants by a complaint or other act to
enforce the right.64 "[Imt is within the implied power of a partner to
institute ordinary legal proceedings in behalf of a firm by using the
names of all the parties as such as plaintiffs for the enforcement of the
rights of the firm." 65
What is "apparently... usual" may take into account the partnership's prior acts as well as the acts of similar partnerships. 66 As noted
above, 67 the commonplace nature of litigation in the United States
60. UNiF. PARTNm Hip ACr § 25, 6 U.L.A. 1, 326 (1969).
61. Stephen v. Phillips, 101 N.M. 790, 689 P.2d 939 (Ct. App. 1984), so implies, but
rejects the suit (for conversion of partnership property) because the suit was not
in behalf of the partnership and the plaintiff testified the property was his, not
the partnership's.
A related argument was made and rejected in Cates v. International Tel. &
Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161, 1177 n.26 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055
(1988). The suing partner claimed the right to sue because the partnerships were
his "alter ego." The court doubted that the argument was valid even if factually
established, noting that the partner was not even a majority owner.
62. See UNIF. PARTNERsHIp ACT § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. 1, 258 (1969), which generally requires a partner to account to the partnership for any benefit derived by him or
her from a partnership-connected transaction.
63. E.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 17(a). See generally F. JAioEs & G. HAZARD, CrVIL PROCE.
DURE

§§ 10.3, 10.6 (1985).

64. A suit will ordinarily be in the scope of the partnership business if the partnership frequently sues (e.g., a landlord or a loan company). However, given the
frequency and breadth of litigation in the United States, filing a suit may be "apparently ...usual" in many other kinds of business.
65. Henson v. First Sec. & Loan Co., 2 P.2d 85 (Wash. 1931).
66. REv. UNIF. PARTNERsHIP AcT § 301(b)(Discussion Draft 1991) would codify this
in the language "for apparently carrying on in the usual way the partnership
business or business of the kind carried on by the partnership."
67. See supra section III.C.
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makes it likely that enforcement of claims will be ordinary for many
partnerships.
If the enforcement act is not "apparently... usual," it is not bind68
ing on the partnership unless "authorized by the other partners."
The "other partners" may, by the standard form agreement of section
18(h) of the U.P.A. or the particular partnership agreement, delegate
enforcement authority to one or a majority or any other number of the
partners. Section 9(2) of the U.P.A. does not specify whether "the
other partners" means all the other partners or only enough other
partners to satisfy the agreement, discussed below, 69 or enough to satisfy the majority rule provision of section 18(h) of the U.P.A., discussed above.70 In contrast, section 9(3) of the U.P.A. specifies that all
partners must approve certain acts, including submission of a partnership claim to arbitration. Section 9(3) implies that something less than
unanimity suffices to file a lawsuit to enforce a partnership claim. On
the other hand, "the other partners" in section 9(2) suggests all other
partners. An act that is not "apparently... usual" is arguably not an
ordinary matter for which a majority is sufficient under the U.P.A.71
Section 9(1) of the U.P.A., then, is inconclusive if enforcement is not
"apparently... usual." Of the possible implications, the more practical and reasonable is that, as to third-party defendants, majority rule
prevails for enforcement which is not "apparently ... usual" and any
partner has authority for enforcement which is "apparently... usual."
F.

Effect of Partnership Agreement

All the provisions discussed in the preceding sections can be varied
by agreement among the partners.72 The agreement can effectively
determine whether fewer than all the partners may enforce a partnership claim. 73 An agreement designating a person as managing partner
may authorize that partner to sue for the partnership if his or her
powers are stated explicitly enough or broadly enough to include litigation of partnership claims. The agreement might be that litigation
68.
69.
70.
71.

UNIF. PARTNESHIIp Acr § 9(2), 6 U.L.A. 1, 132 (1969).
See infra section III.F.
See supra section III.C.
REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 301(c)(Discussion Draft 1991) states that "[ain act
of a partner which is not apparently for carrying on the business of the partner-

ship in the usual way does not bind the partnership unless authorized by the
other partners."
72. UNiF. PARTNERSHnP AcT §§ 9(1), (2), (4), 18, 25(2)(a), 6 U.L.A. 1, 132-33, 213-14,
326 (1969).
73. E.g., Miller v. Stout, 706 S.W.2d 785, 786-87 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)(joint venture
agreement provided that two-thirds in interest of the venturers would be required to "take any other action" with certain exceptions which did not refer to
filing suit; held, 50% in interest could maintain suit in venture name with approval of a 25% interest; no individual venturer need be a party to the suit).
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requires unanimous or majority consent, or approval of designated
partners. The agreement, among other things, may prescribe voting
other than by simple majority, or voting rights in proportion to profit
or capital interests or other methods besides "one-partner-one-vote."
Other aspects of drafting the partnership agreement to deal with enforcement of partnership rights will be considered below. 74
No act in contravention of an agreement among the partners may
be done rightfully without unanimous consent.7 5 If the partners have
agreed to enforce (or not to enforce) a partnership right, that agreement can be altered only by unanimous consent.7 6 For the purpose of
obtaining such consent it is possible to exclude partners who have a
77
conflict of interest.
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF PARTNERSHIP RIGHTS BY FEWER
THAN ALL PARTNERS-OTHER CRITERIA
A.

In General

Apart from the U.P.A.'s guidance discussed in Part III, there are
several other bases on which courts have permitted fewer than all the
partners to enforce a partnership right or claim. One basis is conflict
of interest by partners not joining in the enforcement. Part IV first
considers conflict of interest.7 8 It then discusses other criteria for enforcement by fewer than all the partners.7 9 Finally, for context, enforcement by individual partners of individual claims related to the
partnership is noted.8 0
As was stated above,81 if fewer than all the partners succeed in
enforcing a partnership right, they hold in trust for the partnership
any recovery, or must account to the partnership for it, unless the
82
other partners consent.
74. See infra section VII.E.
75. Cf. Hauer v. Bankers Trust of N.Y. Corp., 65 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Wis. 1974). Proposed
REv. UNIF. PARTNERSiP ACr § 401(j)(Discussion Draft 1991) would replace "no
act in contravention" with the following: "No act outside the ordinary course of
partnership business ... may be undertaken rightfully without the consent of all
of the partners."
76. This argument was made in Cates v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d
1161, 1164, 1173 (5th Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988). But it was not
decided because the partner who filed suit for the partnership died. Control of
the suit then passed, as partnership property, to the surviving partners under
UNF. PARTNERSHMP ACr § 25(2), 6 U.L.A. 1, 326 (1969), rather than to his executrix who was pressing the suit over the opposition of the surviving partners.
77. Cf. Thompson Door Co. v. Haven Fund, 351 A.2d 864 (Del. 1976).
78. See infra section IV.B.
79. See infra section IV.C.
80. See infra section IV.D.
81. See supra section III.A.
82. UNiF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. 1, 258 (1969).
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Effect of Conflict of Interest

When a majority or unanimity requirement for enforcement of a
partnership tight might otherwise apply, a court may create an exception by disregarding partners who are defendants8 3 or otherwise have
a conflict of interest as to the claim being sued on.84 In effect, the
claim may be enforced by a majority of the disinterested partners (if a
majority is required) or by all the disinterested partners (if unanimity
is required). A partnership claim against some partners (e.g., for fiduciary breach or usurpation of partnership opportunity) can be enforced in a suit for accounting, which any partner may bring under the
U.P.A.85 In the most thoughtful opinion dealing with the issue of
conflict of interest, the Fifth Circuit has held that a partner ought to
be able to enforce a partnership claim in "exceptional
circumstances."86
What we do hold is that in a proper case-one where the controlling partners,
for improper, ulterior motives and not because of what they in good faith believe to be the best interests of the partnership, decline to sue on a valid, valuable partnership cause of action which it is advantageous to the partnership to
pursue-Texas law would afford some remedy to the minority partner or partnership interest owner other than merely a damage or accounting suit against
the controlling partners, at least where the latter would8 7not be reasonably
effective to protect the substantial rights of the minority.

The court did not specify whether the nature of the suit would be de83. See, e.g., Serpa v. Jolly King Restaurants, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 626, 631-35 (S.D. Cal.
1974)(applying California law; antitrust claims; finding both standing and capacity to sue; minority partners must sue in partnership name). See also Comment,
Alternative Remedies in Minority Partners'Suits on PartnershipCauses of Action, 39 Sw. L.J. 1021 (1986). When a partner is a defendant, an accounting action
may be the exclusive remedy. See A. BROMBERG & L. RiBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND
RmSTEIN ON PARTNERsHIP § 6.08(c)(1988).

84. E.g., Thompson Door Co. v. Haven Fund, 351 A.2d 864 (Del. 1976)(nonjoining
partners were officers of defendant corporation); Miller v. Stout, 706 S.W.2d 785,
787 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)(25% joint venturers "are disqualified from participating
in any decision concerning the filing of this suit due to a conflict of interest"). Cf.
Cates v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161, 1176-81 (5th Cir. 1985)(applying Texas law), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
85. Lane v. Krein, 375 S.E.2d 351 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988).
86. Cates v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161, 1176, 1183 (5th Cir.
1985)(applying Texas law; dictum), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988). Those circumstances include, in a language somewhat different from that quoted in the
text, at least one
where the controlling nonconsenting partners have conspired with the
defendant third party in committing some material part of the wrongs
complained of and have, in bad faith for their own personal interests and
not with a view to the best interests of the partnerships, colluded with
the third party to prevent the suit.
Id. at 1179.
87. Id. at 1178; Thomasson v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 657 F. Supp. 448,45253 (S.D. Tex. 1987), affl'd, 845 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1988).
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rivative or individual but fractional.88 However, it did indicate that a
fractional claim was a possibility.89 Other possible ways of enforcing
claims despite disagreement of some partners are noted in the next
section.
C.

Other Criteria

Fewer than all the partners may be able to bring a class action in
behalf of all partners-and thereby in behalf of the partnership where
aggregate theory prevails-if they meet the applicable class requirements. These include numerosity, common questions and their predominance, typicality, and adequate representation.9 0
A defendant's failure to make timely objection to the absence of
some partners is usually considered a waiver.9 ' If timely objection is
made, the necessary partners can normally be added by amendment. 92
Intervention by the unnamed partners is another possibility. 93 A dormant partner need not join in a suit to enforce a partnership claim.94
If local rules permit, an indispensable but unwilling partner may
88. Thomasson v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 657 F. Supp. 448, 452 (S.D. Tex.
1987), qff'd, 845 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1988).
89. Cates v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161,1180, 1183 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988). A fractional claim was allowed in Leff v.
Gunter, 33 Cal. 3d 3, 189 Cal. Rptr. 377, 658 P.2d 740 (1983), which is discussed in
note 59 above.
90. E.g., FED. P&Civ. P. 23.
91. See e.g., Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 425 (9th Cir. 1975)(applying
California law;, untimely after trial began); Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 165
F. Supp. 933, 936 (S.D. Cal. 1958)(dictum; applying California law); Engel Mortgage Co. v. Dowd, 355 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)(untimely in motion to
vacate judgment and dismiss for want of jurisdiction); Farish v. Bankers Multiple
Line Ins. Co., 425 So. 2d 12,15-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)(no need to join persons
who may have been partners at the time the claim accrued when the objection to
their absence was raised after limitations had run on any enforcement by those
persons), approvedon thispoint, Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v. Farish, 464 So.
2d 530, 532 (Fla. 1985). See also Semble, DeToro v. Dervan Inv. Ltd. Corp., 483 So.
2d 717 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). Compare Schoenborn v. Williams, 272 P. 992,993
(Mont. 1928), where the objection was not raised until the close of plaintiff's case,
although this does not appear to be part of the rationale for the court's affirmance
of the recovery by the plaintiff partner.
92. See Shoaff v. Gage, 168 F. Supp. 161 (D. Neb. 1958); Sims v. Freeman, 641 S.W.2d
197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)(error to deny timely motion to amend that did not interject new issue or evidence and did not surprise defendant).
93. See McClain v. Buechner, 776 S.W.2d 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). In McCain intervention was tried but failed since the statute of limitations had run.
94. See Shoaff v. Gage, 168 F. Supp. 161, 164 (D. Neb. 1958)(applying Nebraska law);
Dwyer v. Wiley Hotel Co., 108 N.E.2d 859, 860-61 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952). See also
Henry DeCicco & Co. v. Drucker, 10111. App. 2d 340, 343, 243 N.E.2d 456, 459
(1968)(omission of unknown partner "is in no way fatal to [plaintiff partner's]
rights or to the rights of the partnership").
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be added by amendment 95 or court order9 6 as an involuntary plaintiff,97 as a plaintiff on an agreement to indemnify him or her against
costs,98 or as a defendant. 99 In some cases, there is no valid objection
to a partner's absence as a plaintiff if the partner is already before the
court as a true defendant.oo However, these methods may fail if the
majority rule discussed in the preceding Part'0l is applicable and a
majority of the partners oppose the suit. 102 An unusual statute in Wisconsin explicitly permits a partner to sue in the partner's name without joining the copartners if he or she indicates in the pleading that
3
the claim belongs to the partnership.10
A partner may sue individually on a right assigned to him or her by
the partnership' 04 or after the other partners have assigned their interests in the partnership to him or her'O5 or after other partners have
waived their interests in the partnership claim being enforced.0o A
95. See, e.g., Sims v. Freeman, 641 S.W.2d 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)(error to deny
timely motion to amend that did not interject new issue or evidence and did not
surprise defendant).
96. See e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-108 (1982); IowA R. CIV. P. 4;
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 1001(b), 1003 (McKinney 1976).
97. Eg., FED. R Civ. P. 19(a).
98. See, e.g., Rose v. Beckham, 86 So. 2d 275 (Ala. 1956); Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d
758, 761 n.3 (Utah 1984).
99. E.g., Fed. RL Civ. P. 19(a); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-101 (1982); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25317 (1989); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 1001(a)(McKinney 1976); Cates v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161, 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. 1985)(citing Howell v.
Bartlett, 19 S.W.2d 104, 105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919)), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055
(1988); McClain v. Buechner, 776 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)(dictum).
But see Coast v. Hunt Oil Co., 195 F.2d 870, 872 (5th Cir. 1952)(under Louisiana
law single partner could not maintain suit, therefore could not add copartner as
defendant).
100. Spiritas v. Robinowitz, 544 S.W.2d 710, 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). But cf Cates v.
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 486 U.S.
1055 (1988). The presence of the other partners-who had intervened to oppose
the suit-was apparently not a factor in the holding in Cates that the suit might
be maintained if exceptional circumstances exist.
101. See supra section III.C.
102. Lane v. Krein, 375 S.E.2d 351 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988).
103. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 803.01(2)(1981).
104. Foss v. Mansell, 378 So. 2d 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). See Harrell & Sumner
Contracting Co. v. Peabody Petersen Co., 546 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1977)(but for
first joint venturer's assignment of its interest in joint venture contract claim to
second joint venturer, first joint venturer would be an indispensable party as a
matter of federal law for diversity purposes; joint venturer's assignment, retaining a right to half the net proceeds of the claim, was collusive, so failed to achieve
diversity jurisdiction).
105. Johnson v. Secretary of & United States Dep't of Hous., 710 F.2d 1130, 1136-37
(5th Cir. 1983); Stephen v. Phillips, 101 N.M. 790, 689 P.2d 939 (N.M. Ct. App.
1984).
106. Grant County Deposit Bank v. McCampbell, 194 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1952)(partner,
who declined to join as plaintiff, was named as a defendant, and disclaimed any
interest in partnership claim was not an indispensable party and, upon dismissal
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partner who transacted business for the partnership in his or her own
name should ordinarily be able to sue individually on any resulting
claim. 0 T But individual suit has been denied on the ground that it
denies the defendant the right to assert defenses or counterclaims the
defendant might have against the partnership.0s If the partnership
claim is based on a statute expressing or implying a strong policy in
favor of private litigation, a court is more likely to permit a single
partner or fewer than all the partners to enforce the claim. 09
In the course of winding up after dissolution, one partner has been
allowed to sue on a partnership claim despite the refusal of the other
partner to join.110 While this approach is consistent with part of the
analysis in Part III,ii1 it is inconsistent with the majority rule which is
required by the U.P.A. and which normally continues during winding
up. If the partnership is dissolved, a partner who is blocked from suing directly or derivatively may be able to obtain the appointment of a
receiver who has authority to sue to enforce the partnership's
claims.1 2 Similarly a partnership's bankruptcy trustee may enforce

107.

108.
109.

110.

111.
112.

of the claim, did not destroy diversity jurisdiction; judgment for other partners
against third party affirmed).
Hutchinson v. Brotman-Sherman Theatres, Inc., 94 M. App. 3d 1066, 1071-72, 419
N.E.2d 530, 535 (1981)(third party contracting with partner "d/b/a T.K.O. Productions" knew of partnership and partners). See Henry DeCiccio & Co. v. Drucker,
101 IM. App. 2d 340, 243 N.E.2d 456 (1968)(plaintiff DeCiccio Co., apparently a
partnership, was allowed to enforce a contract made in the name of DeCiccio
Painting Service, treated as an individual contract). Compare the right of a partner under UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 10(3), 6 U.L.A, 1,155 (1969), to convey partnership property the title to which is in the partner's name.
South Texas Aggregates, Inc. v. Pendell, 694 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 165 F. Supp. 933, 935, 937 (S.D. Cal. 1958)(antitrust); Serpa v. Jolly King Restaurants, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 626, 632-35 (S.D. Cal.
1974)(antitrust).
Goldstick v. Kusmiersky, 593 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Il. 1984), rev'd on othergrounds,
788 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1986); Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 165 F. Supp. 933,
936-37 (S.D. Cal. 1958). Both district courts cite UNtF. PARTNERSHmip ACr
§ 35(1)(a), 6 U.L.A. 1, 429 (1969), which grants a partner authority to bind the
partnership by acts appropriate for winding up. The Gold.stick district court also
cites a holding that a dead partner's estate need not be joined as a plaintiff. The
holding is inapposite since only partners, not estates (except the estate of the last
partner), may participate in winding up under UNIF.PARTNERSHIP ACT § 37, 6
U.L.A. 1, 444 (1969). Finally, the Goldstick district court cites a pre-U.P.A. decision, Heartt v. Walsh, 75 M. 200, 202 (1874). Neither district court cites the majority rule in section 18(h) of the U.P.A.
See supra sections B, E & F of Part Ill.
Cates v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161, 1178-79, 1183 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988). The court of appeals in Cates cited J.
CRANE & A. BROMBERG, PARTNERSHIP 470 (1968), and suggested that the suit
might be delayed pending appointment of the receiver. See also Glusband v. Fittin Cunningham Lauzon, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 145, 148-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)(limited
partnership's receiver has standing to sue on partnership's securities fraud
claim). "Exceptional circumstances" involving a conflict of interest by the non-
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the partnership's claims.113
Individual Claims

D.

A partner may, of course, sue individually on his or her individual
claim. But the line between partnership claims and a partner's individual claims is not always clear. To try to avoid the limitations on
enforcement of partnership claims described in the preceding sections
and Part II, plaintiffs have sometimes asserted that they are suing on
individual claims when the claims are related to an injury to the partnership. Claims that have been regarded as partnership claims rather

than individual include:
-

-

Claims of injury to a partner's interest in the partnership (e.g.,
reduction in value of the interest) or to the partner's contribution to the partnership or to the partner's income stream from
the partnership."i 4
Claims of loss of reputation from failure of the partnership
business and related loss of opportunity to advance in the

industry."i 5

Claims of economic injury to property owned in undivided in6
terest by a partner but operated by the partnership."i
Claims that have been regarded as individual include:
Claims of tortious interference with the relationship between
-

a partner and the partnership (or copartners).ii

113.
114.

115.
116.
117.

7

joining partners are considered in section IV.B above. See supratext accompanying notes 86-88. Where a strong entity theory prevails, as in Louisiana, suits may
be permitted only by the partnership. See infra section VI.B.
E.g., Thomasson v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 657 F. Supp. 448, 452-53
(S.D. Tex. 1987), qff'd, 845 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1988)(partners denied right to sue
because claim was property of partnership bankruptcy estate).
Cates v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161, 1181-82 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988); Thomasson v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 657 F. Supp. 448,453 (S.D. Tex. 1987)(plaintiffs alleged that banks financing a
gas processing plant conspired with the managing partner to cause the partnership to default on its loan and lose the plant through foreclosure), aff'd, 845 F.2d
1020 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Summit Ridge Apartments, Ltd., 104 Bankr. 405, 410
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989).
Cates v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161, 1181-82 (5th Cir. 1985),
cerL denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
Coast v. Hunt Oil Co., 195 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.)(applying Louisiana law), cert denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952).
Thomasson v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 657 F. Supp. 448, 453 (S.D. Tex.
1987), aff'd, 845 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1988). See also Cates v. International Tel. &
Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161, 1182 (5th Cir. 1985)(noting that such claims might be
individual), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988). The court of appeals in Cates similarly described a minority partner's claims that the majority partners, and third
parties who had injured the partnership business, had disparaged his business
ability and tried to drive him out of the insurance industry. It remanded for consideration of the individual claims. Cf. Abel v. American Art Analog, Inc., 838
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Claims of fraud inducing the partners to invest in the
8
partnership.31
Claims to receive profits of a corporation (owned by a third
party) to which the partnership had assigned its publishing
project in return for payment of thirty percent of the profits to
the three partners.1 1 9

V. ENFORCEMENT OF PARTNERSHIP RIGHTS BY FEWER
THAN ALL PARTNERS-DERVATIVE SUITS
A.

In General

The general distinction between direct and derivative enforcement
of partnership rights was introduced earlier.12 0 This Part discusses derivative enforcement. A derivative suit is typically styled A in behalf
of ABC Partnershipv. D, or A derivativelyfor ABC Partnershipv. D,
orA in the rightof ABC Partnershipv. D. The substantive distinction
between a derivative suit and enforcement of a partnership right by
fewer than all the partners is not always clear but seems to be as follows: In a derivative suit, the plaintiff partner is typically acting
against the wishes of those partners who have decisionmaking authority for enforcement of the partnership right; in a direct enforcement
by fewer than all the partners, on the other hand, the plaintiff partners are typically acting with approval of, or without objection from,
the partners with authority perhaps excluding the partners with conflict of interest. However, this distinction does not always prevail, and
there are cases which are treated as direct, but in which partners with
authority are objecting.' 2 '
Derivative suits in general partnerships are in an early stage of development. By contrast, derivative suits in limited partnerships are
well developed through earlier caselaw 2 2 and later statutes.123 There,
F.2d 691, 695-98 (3d Cir. 1988) (tortious interference claim failed on merits because
partnership was dissolved before alleged interference occurred).
118. In re Summit Ridge Apartments, Ltd., 104 Bankr. 405, 409-10 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1989)(individual partners denied permissive intervention in bankruptcy proceeding and required to assert their individual fraud claims in a nonbankruptcy

forum).
119. Abel v. American Art Analog, Inc., 838 F.2d 691, 695-96 (3d Cir. 1988). The court
in Abel held that the other partners (whose joinder would have destroyed diversity) need not be joined. The court noted that they might sue separately for their
shares of the profit. On another point, the court held that the assignment of the

project to the corporation dissolved the partnership. This may have influenced
its decision that the partners had individual rights to profit shares from the corporation although it did not mention the dissolution relative to the individual
shares.
120. See supra section I.B.
121. See supra notes 48-55.
122. E.g., Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965).
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derivative suits are used primarily by limited partners against general
partners (e.g., for fiduciary breach or other misconduct in the management of the partnership). In general partnerships, such claims can
readily be brought in an action for an accounting. Derivative suits by
general partnerships against third parties may be less often necessary
than by limited partnerships because of the general partners' shared
managerial powers which may include enforcing partnership claims
against third parties. This may explain the slower evolution of general partnership derivative suits. Nonetheless, given the need for enforcement against third parties and the divided caselaw on the ability
of fewer than all the partners to enforce, there is a need-at least occasionally-for something like the derivative suit. The need is even
greater where some of the partners have a conflict of interest in respect of enforcing the claim, although some courts have found ways of
permitting enforcement in this situation without using derivative language or procedures.
B.

Validity

For the reasons given in the preceding section, it is not surprising
that courts' 2 4 and commentators 2 5 have started to indicate the appropriateness of derivative suits, using analogies from shareholder and
director enforcement of corporate rights and beneficiary enforcement
of trust rights. Some courts indicate that a derivative suit is the only
way fewer than all the partners may enforce a partnership claim: "A
member of a partnership seeking to recover from a third party a debt
due the partnership must bring the action on behalf of and for the
benefit of the partnership and may not recover upon such an obligation individually."' 12 6
Some courts have rejected a general partner's derivative suit partly
on the ground that derivative suits are authorized by statute for corporate shareholders and for limited partners but not for general partners.i27 Additional grounds suggested are that general partners have
123. E.g., REv. UNIF. LTD.PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 1001-1004,6 U.L.A. 239, 401-04 (1976 &
Supp. 1991)(amended 1985).
124. Cates v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161,1176-81 (5th Cir. 1985)(authorizing derivative or similar suit in "exceptional circumstances"), cert denied,
486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
125. Arguments for and against partnership derivative suits are carefully considered
in Comment, supra note 83, which finds preponderant the arguments for.
126. Kirschbaum v. Merchants Bank of N.Y., 272 A.D. 336, 336, 71 N.Y.S.2d 79, 80
(1947); International Television Prods., Ltd. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 622 F.
Supp. 1532, 1536 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)(contract claim of joint venture).
127. Hauer v. Bankers Trust of N.Y. Corp., 65 F.R.D. 1, 4 (E.D. Wis. 1974)(applying
Wisconsin law). The other ground-objection by a majority of the general partners who were granted control by the partnership agreement-is considered in
section III.C above. See also Kline Hotel Partners v. Aircoa Equity Interests, Inc.,
708 F. Supp. 1193, 1194-95 (D. Colo. 1989)(applying Colorado law).
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other effective remedies-such as accounting, dissolution and contribution rights-while shareholders and limited partners do not.828
However, these are remedies against the other partners and unlikely
to be effective to enforce partnership rights against third persons. It
would be strange if a partner could not litigate a partnership claim in
which he or she had a rather immediate interest while a shareholder
could litigate a corporate claim in which he or she has a very remote
interest.
C.

Requirements

The requirements for a partnership derivative suit are not well developed. The indications are that they will be less complex than those
for corporate derivative suits.9 But they are likely to include demand on the other partners to sue, or a showing of the futility of demand. Similar requirements for derivative suits by limited partners
have now been widely adopted.130 The most comprehensive judicial
discussion of such suits suggests a more stringent requirement as one
of its criteria for those "exceptional circumstances" that justify a derivative suit or direct suit by fewer than all the partners:
We do not hold that Texas law would necessarily allow a derivative action on
the part of a minority partner or an owner of a partnership interest. What we
do hold is that in a proper case-one where the controlling partners, for improper, ulterior motives and not because of what they in good faith believe to
be the best interests of the partnership, decline to sue on a valid, valuable
partnership cause of action which it is advantageous to the partnership to pursue-Texas law would afford some remedy to the minority partner or partnership interest owner otherthan merely a damage or accounting suit against the
controlling partners, at least where the latter would not be reasonably effec1 31
tive to protect the substantial rights of the minority.

The effect of the other partners' response to a derivative plaintiff's
128. Kline Hotel Partners v. Aircoa Equity Interests, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 1193, 1195 (D.
Colo. 1989). The court understates the rights of limited partners to accounting
and perhaps to dissolution.
129. Corporate derivative suits are discussed at length in D. DEMoyrr, SHAREHOLDER
DERIVATIVE ACToNs (1987), and more summarily in 1 R. MAGNUSON, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION §§ 8.01-.28 (1984).
130. Rxv. UNiF. LTD. PARTNERsHm Acr § 1001, 6 U.L_.A 239, 401 (1976 & Supp.
1991)(amended 1985)(limited partner may bring suit "if general partners with authority to do so have refused to bring the action or an effort to cause those general partners to bring the action is not likely to succeed").
131. Cates v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161, 1178 (5th Cir. 1985)(applying Texas law)(emphasis in original), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988); Thomasson v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 657 F. Supp. 448,452-53 (S.D. Tex. 1987),
aff'd, 845 F.2d 1020 (th Cir. 1988). The Fifth Circuit added. "[W]e do not suggest
that these remedies are available to invade the good faith managerial business
judgment of the controlling partners, despite the fact that the court might disagree with such judgment or even view it as not being entirely reasonable." Cates
v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161,1179 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied,
486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
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demand might be determined by the rules of the U.P.A. discussed in
Part III above. For example, if the suit is deemed an extraordinary
matter requiring unanimous consent, any partner's objection might
undermine the suit by virtue of section 18(h) of the U.P.A. If the suit
is considered an ordinary matter requiring majority approval under
section 18(h), failure to obtain approval might undermine the suit.
But the U.P.A. might be overlooked in preference for corporate analogies, much as it has been overlooked in preference for procedural issues of necessary or indispensable parties referred to in Part II above.
Corporate analogies could lead a court to a number of different positions, including (a) acceptance of the partners' decision if they have
independence, adequate investigation and good faith (similar to the
corporate business judgment standard), (b) exercise of the court's
own business judgment to decide whether the suit should proceed, and
(c) rejection of the decision of partners who are named defendants or
otherwise in a conflict position.1 3 2 The opinion just quoted does not
consider the U.P.A. and does mention corporate analogies; its position
133
has elements of (a), (b) and (c) but seems closer to (a).
The federal rule on derivative suits applies alike to corporations
and unincorporated associations, presumably including partnerships.
A partnership derivative suit in federal court would require the plaintiff partner to plead, among other things, "the efforts, if any, made by
the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not
making the effort."134 The plaintiff in federal court must also show
that he or she adequately represents the interests of the members.1S
A number of state procedural rules are similar to the federal rules.136
The partnership may be named as a nominal defendant in a derivative suit. If the applicable law requires that all partners be named in a
suit against the partnership, they should also be named in a derivative
suit. They may also be nominal parties if no relief is sought against
them.
A partner's derivative suit would appropriately be carried on at the
partner's individual expense, subject to (1) indemnification or reimbursement from the partnership under the U.P.A.137 if the expense is
found to be reasonably made in the ordinary and proper conduct of the
132. These and other variations are discussed in D. DEMor, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATrIVE AcrioNs §§ 5.03-.06 (1987).
133. See the additional language quoted from Cates in note 131 above.
134. FED. R. CIrv. P. 23.1.
135. Id. See D. DEMorr, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE AcTIoNs § 4.04 (1987).
136. D. DEMorr, SHAREHOLDER DERiVATIVE ACTIONS § 4.02, at 9-29 (1987), provides a

chart of the state requirements.
137. UNri. PARmNEHm ACT § 18(b), 6 U.L.A. 1, 213 (1969).
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firm's business or for the preservation of its business or property, 38 or
(2) an award of attorney's fees on the corporate precedent if the suit is

successful.139 A derivative suit may not be maintained if the partner-

ship is already suing on the same claim.140
VI.

ENFORCEMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CLAIMS BY
PARTNERSHIPS (IN PARTNERSHIP NAME)

A.

In General

At common law a partnership could not sue in its own name,
although a few courts have allowed it to do so.' 4 ' A number of states
have by statute or procedural rule authorized partnerships to sue in
their own names.142
B. Without Statute or Rule
Where there is no procedural rule or statute to modify the common
law aggregate theory of partnership, and where the courts have not
accepted the U.P.A.'s modification of the aggregate theory, most
courts hold that a partnership cannot sue in the partnership name
since it lacks capacity or is not considered a legal person. 14 3 Other
138. See Evans v. Boggs, 35 Tenn. App. 354, 386-87,245 S.W.2d 641,656 (1951)(partners
who sued successfully to recover firm assets over objections of copartners entitled
to reimbursement of attorneys fees and expenses).
139. Attorney fees in corporate suits are discussed in D. DEMorr, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE AcTIoNs § 6.04 (1987).
140. In re Summit Ridge Apartments, Ltd., 104 Bankr. 405, 410 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1989)(claim being asserted by partnership as debtor in possession in bankruptcy
reorganization).
141. See infra section VI.B.
142. See infra section VI.C.
143. E.g., Excalibur Oil, Inc. v. Sullivan, 659 F. Supp. 1539, 1540-41 n.1 (N.D. Ill.
1987)(dictum; by negative inference from statute permitting partnership to be
sued in firm name). Perhaps the strongest statement and surely one of the most
metaphorical is the followingThe Uniform Partnership Law did not transform a partnership into a
separate or juristic entity and generally, all partners are necessary parties-plaintiff to enforce an obligation due the partnership. [A] partnership has no legal existence apart from its members, but is a mere ideal
entity... [a] caponized litigant whose crowings will gain... neither
success nor posterity.
Allgeier, Martin & Assocs. v. Ashmore, 508 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Mo. App. 1974)(citations omitted).
Accord Randle v. Spectran, 129 F.R.D. 386, 389 (D. Mass. 1988)(dismissing
claims under Massachusetts law brought by partnership but sustaining its federal
law claims under FED. R. Crv. P. 17(b)); Metzger Bros., Inc. v. Friedman, 288 Ala.
386, 396, 261 So. 2d 398, 406 (1971)(partnership not a person); Aronovitz v. Stein
Properties, 322 So. 2d 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)(similar); Marvil Properties v.
Fripp Island Dev. Corp., 273 S.C. 619, 258 S.E.2d 106 (1979)(even though partnership considered as an entity for determining legal relationships and liabilities of
partners). Cf. Dolph v. Cortez, 8 Ariz. App. 429, 430, 446 P.2d 939, 940 n.1
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courts, led by a Montana decision, recognize the modern treatment of
a partnership as an entity. In allowing the suit by the partnership, the
Montana court reasoned from the U.P.A. that it would be illogical and
unfair to permit a partnership to own a claim44 but not to enforce it,
or to own property14 5 but not to protect it.'46 Some other courts
agree,147 especially if the suit is to protect partnership property.148
Even where a partnership is regarded as lacking capacity to sue, a defendant's failure to make timely objection will usually be treated as a
waiver.14 9 Where a strong entity concept prevails, as in Louisiana, a
partnership right may be enforced only in the partnership name. 150
When the partnership cannot sue, it follows that partners must be
plaintiffs. That may mean all partners, a majority of partners or a
151
single partner as discussed earlier.

144.
145.
146.

147.

148.

149.
150.

151.

(1968)(dictum, citing a statute stating that in situations not covered by the U.P.A.,
the common law applies). Arizona has since adopted a rule permitting partnerships to sue and be sued in the firm name.
A reason given in some early cases is that an organization's ability to sue or be
sued is a corporate characteristic which can be granted only by legislation. See,
e.g., American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' & Die Makers Unions, 90 F. 598,
600 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1898).
A joint venture's capacity is treated like a partnership's. Cases are collected in
Annotation, Joint Venture's Capacity To Sue, 56 A.L.R4th 1234 (1987).
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 9(3)(e), 6 U.L.A. 1, 132 (1969)(requiring unanimous
partner consent to submit a partnership claim to arbitration).
Id. §§ 8, 9, 10, 6 U.L.A. at 115, 132-33, 155-56.
Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 220 Mont. 251, 714 P.2d 155
(1986) (contract claim; joint venture treated as partnership). The court in Decker
Coal also noted statutes permitting partnerships to be sued in the partnership
name and, in small claims courts, to sue in the partnership name. Id at 255, 714
P.2d at 157.
Gary Energy Corp. v. Metro Oil Prods., 114 F.R.D. 69 (D. Utah 1987)(suit for collection of open accounts for products sold brought in partnership name); Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 1988)(lessor's recovery of leased
property).
Malibu Partners, Ltd. v. Schooley, 372 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)(to
contest ad valorem tax on partnership property); Pinellas County v. Lake Padgett
Pines, 333 So. 2d 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)(to enjoin well field development
that would damage partnership property); New England Herald Dev. Group v.
Town of Falmouth, 521 A.2d 693 (Me. 1987)(to review adverse zoning decision on
partnership property). Suits of this sort have a kind of in rem quality that makes
legal personality of the partnership less important. In such suits the partners are
likely to be in agreement and questions of authority are therefore less important.
See Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988).
Haddock Flying Serv. v. Tisdale, 288 S.C. 62, 339 S.E.2d 525 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986).
Johnson v. Secretary of & United States Dep't of Hous., 710 F.2d 1130, 1136 (5th
Cir. 1983); Coast v. Hunt Oil Co., 195 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836
(1952); Dalby v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 365 So. 2d 568, 570 (La. Ct.
App. 1978)(alternative holding); Davis v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 272 So. 2d
430 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Apex Sales Co. v. Abraham, 201 So. 2d 184, 187-88 (La. Ct.
App. 1967).
See supra Parts II-V.
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C. With Statute or Rule
Many jurisdictions, including a number of the major commercial
ones, have statutes or rules saying that partnerships may sue in the
partnership name' 5 2 or, more generally, that unincorporated associations may sue in their own names. 153 Some of these provisions are
motivated by impatience with the common law rule: "The rule that a
partnership may not sue or be sued in its partnership name is merely a
useless relic of the strict procedural rules at common law with nothing, apparently, to justify its continued existence."1 54
Provisions for partnerships to be sued in the partnership name are
more numerous and generally came earlier than provisions for partnerships to sue in the firm name. This is because it is costlier and
more difficult for third-party plaintiffs to identify and locate partners
than it is for partnership plaintiffs to gather the necessary members to

join in a suit.
Common name provisions eliminate any basis for a defendant's objection that the plaintiff partnership lacks capacity to sue. Moreover,
the provisions typically make it unnecessary for any partner to sue
individually, much less for all partners to sue.'5 3 But it still may be
open to a defendant or a partner to show that the suit is brought without authority.
152. E.g., ARI.

56

& Civ. P. 17(j); CAI. CIV. PROC. CODE § 388 (West 1973); COLO. REv.

STAT. ANN. § 13-50-105 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-112 (West 1960); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3904 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-8-15.1 (1981); IND. . TRIAL

P. 17(B), (E); IOWA R. Civ. P. 4; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-344 (1983); LA. CODE CIV.
PRoc. ANN. art. 688 (West 1991); MA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 160-A (1978); MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2051(2) (West 1981); NEB. REV.STAT. § 25-313 (1989);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-4-5 (1978); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 1025 (McKinney 1976);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-69.1 (1983); OHIo REV.CODE ANN. § 2307.24 (Anderson 1981);
12, § 1082 (West 1988); TEx . Civ. P. 28 (West 1990); VT.
OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit.
STAT. ANN. tit.12, § 814 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 50-8.1 (1989); WYo. . Cirv. P.
17(b).
153. ILL. ANN. STAT. § 2-209.1 (1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-10-6 (1978).

154. Ruzicka v. Rager, 305 N.Y. 191, 197, 111 N.E.2d 878, 881 (N.Y. 1953)(quoting 1945
N.Y. JuDIcIAL COuNciL ANN. REP.221,224 (commenting on N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. &
R. 1025 (McKinney 1976)(originally enacted as N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act, L.1945, chap.
842, § 222-a))).
155. Miller v. Stout, 706 S.W.2d 785,787 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)(if the two-thirds majority
required by the joint venture agreement consent, suit may be filed in the venture's name without joinder of individual members). See also Johnson v. Pioneer
Mortgage Co., 264 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954)(no need to identify partners
in complaint; defendant may obtain that information by discovery); Navigator
Group Funds v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Cf. Hanna Mining Co. v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 573 F. Supp. 1395,1399 (D.
Minn. 1983)("Generally, all partners must join in asserting a partnership claim
under a contract if the suit is not in the name of the partnership."), qff'd, 739 F.2d
1368 (8th Cir. 1984).
156. See Navigator Group Funds v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 416
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). The court in that case refused to dismiss a suit brought in name
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Common name provisions are permissive, not mandatory.157 Partners may continue to sue as individuals, subject to the limitations described earlier.'58
The federal rules have a partial common name provision: a partnership "may sue or be sued in its common name for the purpose of
enforcing for or against it a substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States."159 Partnerships may sue and

be sued in federal court on a variety of federal claims, such as civil

rights, antitrust and securities. 160 In other federal court cases, capac-

ity to sue or be sued is determined by the law of the state in which the
court sits.161

157.
158.
159.
160.

161.

of limited partnership where the defendants offered no evidence that a general
partner failed to authorize the suit. The court stated: "Nor have the defendants
cited any authority for the proposition that proper authorization for the bringing
of the action by the partnership must be alleged in the complaint." Id. at 417 n.1.
See also Miller v. Stout, 706 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. App. 1986)(error to exclude
plaintiffs' evidence that requisite majority had consented).
See also Thompson Door Co. v. Haven Fund, 351 A.2d 864, 865 (Del. 1976)(denying motion to dismiss; each partner has power to use legal process to enforce
partnership claims, especially where copartners have conflicting interests). For
further discussion of a partner's authority to sue, see the discussion in section
III.E above. C. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 370 (1958)(in agent's action
for principal's benefit "it is a defense that the agent does not have authority from
the principal to sue or to continue the action").
The somewhat parallel question of a corporate officer's authority to file suit in
the corporation's name is discussed in H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 225, at 600-03 (3d ed. 1983); Goebel, Authority of the PresidentOver
Corporate Litigation- A Study in Inherent Agency, 37 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 29
(1962); Annotation, Power of Presidentof Corporationto Have Litigation Instituted by It Where a Board of DirectorsHas Failedor Refused to GrantPermission, 10 A.L.R.2d 701 (1950); Annotation, Power of Secretary or Treasurer of
Corporation to Institute Litigationfor It, 64 A.L.R2d 900 (1959); Annotation,
Power of Presidentof Corporationto Commence or to Carry on ArbitrationProceedings, 65 A.L.R.2d 1321 (1959).
Frazier v. Carlin, 42 Colo. App. 226, 228-29, 591 P.2d 1348, 1350 (1979); Ruzicka v.
Rager, 305 N.Y. 191, 197 111 N.E.2d 878, 881 (N.Y. 1953).
See supra Parts II-V; Chien v. Chen, 759 S.W.2d 484, 489-92 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
E.g., Randle v. Spectran, 129 F.R.D. 386, 389 (D. Mass. 1988)(federal securities law
claims); Caliber Partners, Ltd. v. Affeld, 583 F. Supp. 1308, 1313 (N.D. Ill.
1984)(federal securities law claims); Serpa v. Jolly King Restaurants, Inc., 62
F.LD. 626, 632 (S.D. Cal. 1974)(federal antitrust claims). Rule 17(b) has been
interpreted to let a partnership sue to enforce an arbitration agreement involving
otherwise nonfederal issues on the theory that the enforceability of an arbitration
agreement is a substantive federal right by virtue of the Federal Arbitration Act,
9 U.S.C. §§ I to 15 (1988). See 0 & Y Landmark Assocs. of Va. v. Nordheimer, 725
F. Supp. 578 (D.D.C. 1989).
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b). See, e.g., Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 220
Mont. 251, 714 P.2d 155 (1986) (construing local law on a certified question from
the Ninth Circuit); Caliber Partners, Ltd. v. Affeld, 583 F. Supp. 1308, 1313-14
(N.D. ill. 1984)(limited partnerships have capacity to sue on federal securities
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VII. ENFORCEMENT OF PARTNERSHIP RIGHTSA CRITIQUE
A.

In General

The law on enforcement of partnership rights or claims is needlessly complicated and inconsistent. By way of conclusion this Part
indicates ways enforcement can be made more consistent and perhaps
less complicated by legislatures, courts, litigators and drafters of partnership agreements.
B. Legislatures
Enforcement of partnership rights has been greatly simplified in
one respect by common name statutes or procedural rules of the kind
discussed in Part V above1 62 and adopted in a number of states. Section 307(a) of the proposed Revised Uniform Partnership Act would
embrace this simplification by prescribing that "[a] partnership may
sue and be sued in the partnership name." 163 This or similar legislation (or procedural rules) should be adopted by states that do not already have it.
C. Courts-General Principles
For their part, the courts could greatly simplify the law by focusing
less on abstract jurisdictional issues and more on practical operational
and contractual issues reflected in these general principles:
(1) Recognize the commercial reality of the partnership as an entity in many, perhaps most, instances.
(2) Recognize the substantial "partner authority" of each member of a general partnership. Unless challenged, a partner's
capacity or authority to sue for the partnership should be
presumed.
(3) If the capacity of the suing partner(s) is challenged, determine
the capacity in accordance with the partnership agreement if
the agreement reasonably addresses the point, and if it does
not, in accordance with guidance of the U.P.A. described in
section D below as standards.
1 64
(4) Assure that all partners are aware of enforcement actions
and given an opportunity to participate in them.
claims but not on pendent state law claims for which Illinois law controls); Randle v. Spectran, 129 F.R.D. 386, 389 (D. Mass. 1988)(similar; Massachusetts law).
162. See supra section V.I.
163. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 12, 6 U.L.A. 1, 160 (1969); REv. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP

Acr § 307(a)(Discussion Draft 1991). If the statutory attribution of partner's
knowledge to the partnership seems insufficient in a situation, notice to partners

can be ordered.
164. See supra section HI.D.
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(5) Recognize the quite different interests of nonpartner defendants and nonsuing partners 65 in the enforcement of partnership rights. Indeed, given the preclusive effect appropriately
accorded a suit by fewer than all the partners, a court should
have serious doubts whether a nonpartner defendant has any
legitimate basis for objecting to the absence of some partners.
Objection should be allowed only on a convincing showing
that the defendant is subject to repetitive suit if the pending
suit proceeds to final judgment or settlement with the
plaintiff.
(6) Assure that any recovery in an action initiated by fewer than
all the partners benefits the partnership unless there are
strong equitable reasons1 66 to limit the recovery to the suing
partners (alone or with some of the other partners). Absent
such reasons, recovery by the suing partners should go to the
partnership in accordance with the U.P.A.167 which requires a
partner to account to the partnership for any benefits--and to
hold as trustee for the partnership any profits--derived by
him from transactions connected with the partnership. But
benefit to the partnership can be more directly accomplished
by including the partnership in the judgment.
(7) Assure that the defendant is protected from multiple suits by
reciting in the judgment that it is binding on the partnership
and all its partners.
D.

Courts-Uniform Partnership Act Standards

The several seemingly inconsistent sections of the U.P.A. relevant
to enforcement of partnership rights and the "partner authority" of
each member of a general partnership can be reconciled and best
given effect as follows if there is no controlling provision in the partnership agreement:
- If the enforcement is an ordinary matter' 66 and there is no disagreement among the partners, any partner can enforce a partnership right.169

-

If the enforcement is an ordinary matter and there is disagreement among the partners, a majority' 7 0 can enforce or can au-

165. The difference between the interests of nonpartner defendants and nonsuing

partners is discussed in section I.B above.
166. Strong equitable reasons might exist when recovery by the partnership would
benefit partners who participated in the wrong being sued on. Similar reasons

167.
168.
169.
170.

have allowed direct recovery by some shareholders in corporate derivative suits.
See D. DFMorr, SHAREHOLDER DFsuvATrvE AcTIONS § 7.06, at 31-32 (1987).
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. 1, 258 (1969).
What is an ordinary matter is discussed in section II.C above.
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 9(1), 18(e), 25(2)(a), 6 U.L.A. 1, 132, 213, 326 (1969).
Even if the agreement is otherwise silent on enforcement, it may state that deci-
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thorize any partner to enforce.171
If the enforcement is not an ordinary matter, all partners must
enforce or authorize fewer than all the partners to enforce.172
The standards are the same, whether a nonpartner defendant (if
allowed to object at all) or a nonsuing partner is objecting to the enforcement by fewer than all the partners. However, differences in application of the standards are appropriate. Section 9(1) of the U.P.A. is
primarily concerned with partnership and partner relations to third
parties including defendants. Sections 18(e), 18(h) and 25(2)(a) are internal governance provisions primarily concerned with relations
among the partners and within the partnership. Together these sections justify divergent allocations of the triple burden-of pleading,
production of evidence, and persuasion-to nonpartner defendants
and to nonsuing partners. A nonpartner defendant, to prevail on the
ground that fewer than all the partners have sued, should satisfy the
triple burden on one of the following.173
(1) The partnership agreement denies authority of the plaintiff
partner(s) to bring the enforcement action; or
(2) Enforcement is an ordinary matter on which there is partner
disagreement and a majority of the partners do not agree with
the enforcement action and there is nothing in the partnership agreement to authorize the action; or
(3) The enforcement action is not an ordinary matter and any
partner disagrees with the enforcement action and there is
nothing in the partnership agreement to authorize the enforcement action.
Thus, for the nonpartner defendant the lack of capacity or authority of the plaintiff partner(s) is an affirmative defense if that defendant is permitted to raise the issue.
There is no justification for imposing the triple burden on a nonsuing partner who is not a defendant. That partner can appropriately
insist on strict observance of the partnership's internal governance
provisions. Accordingly, he or she should be entitled to dismissal of
the enforcement action if he or she intervenes unless the suing partner meets the triple burden on either of the following
(1) The partnership agreement authorizes enforcement by the
plaintiff partner(s); or
-

sions are to be made by a majority in interest or some method other than one vote
per partner. The agreement will, of course, control.
171. UNiF. PARTNERSHIn Acr §§ 9(1), 18(e), (h), 25(2)(a), 6 U.L.A. 1, 132, 213, 326
(1969).

172. Id §§ 9(1), 18(e), 25(2)(a), 6 U.L.A. at 132, 213, 326.
173. A third party suing the partnership on the basis of a partner's act has the burden
of proof that the act was "apparently ... usual." See Stratemeyer v. West, 12511.
App. 3d 597,602,466 N.E.2d 306,309 (1984); Burns v. Gonzalez, 439 S.W.2d 128,132
(Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
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(2) Enforcement is an ordinary matter (the other partner's intervention establishes disagreement) and a majority of the partners favor the enforcement action.
In applying all the foregoing rules a court should consider only the
disinterested partners where some partners have a conflict of interest
in the enforcement of the right, as opposed to a disagreement about
the wisdom of enforcement.
Objections to enforcement by fewer than all the partners should be
required early in the pleading stage of litigation, particularly if raised
by a defendant. If sustained, the result should be no more severe than
dismissal with leave to amend or without prejudice. Early objections,
if sustained, may permit joinder of the requisite partners or avoid the
running of limitations. Late objections should be overruled or treated
as waived.
In the few situations where the prior measures would still not permit enforcement of an apparently valuable partnership right, the
courts should allow a derivative suit by any partner.
E.

Lifigators

Partners, or their counsel, seeking to enforce partnership rights
should, of course, ascertain the forum's applicable law on who can enforce the partnership's rights. If all partners must be parties, they
should be so named. If fewer than all may sue, in many cases it will be
desirable for the suing partners to plead that they sue with authority.174 It may be desirable to plead details of the authority-for example, authority by the partnership agreement, by specified vote or
consent of the partners, or by section 9(1) of the U.P.A.-and underlying facts. Defendants in suits by fewer than all the partners should
raise their objections early by motion to dismiss or similar pleading or,
at the latest, by answer.
F.

Drafters

Since the partnership agreement will control, its drafters (and of
course the partners) should give consideration to whether the agreement ought to deal specifically with who has authority to enforce partnership rights. If they do not, the results are uncertain since the
U.P.A. is not specific on the matter, the case law is mixed and general
provisions in the agreement on power and authority may or may not
be interpreted to cover enforcement of partnership rights.
The agreement may give enforcement authority to any partner, a
managing partner, a designated committee of partners, a majority of
174. This may be undesirable in a jurisdiction where a general denial requires that
plaintiff(s) prove everything in the complaint.
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the partners or all the partners unanimously. A majority may be any
specified proportion above fifty percent. It may be (and frequently is)
measured by profits, capital accounts, points or other designated
formula.
Some specific expression of authority is almost always desirable. If
litigation is likely to be frequent because of the nature of the partnership business, it is advisable to delegate authority to one (or any one)
partner or a small group. If the partners are numerous, it is vi.tually
essential to have a delegation of authority to one or a small group of
partners. Even if the partners are few, there are advantages to specifying that any partner may sue for the partnership. Provisions of this
kind will facilitate enforcement of partnership rights against third
parties.
If the partners prefer to retain a more collective decisionmaking
process for each enforcement opportunity yet want to minimize challenges and delays by defendants, a provision of this sort might be written: Any partner has authority to enforce a partnership right or claim
unless written objections are filed with a designated person by a majority of the partners.
The partners should also consider whether the agreement ought to
limit or deny enforcement authority when a partner will be a defendant and leave that to an action for an accounting.
If enforcement authority is delegated by the agreement, it should
specify that the designated person(s) may sue in the partnership name
or include all partners as parties (plaintiffs or defendants) if required
by applicable law.

